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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1432 
___________ 
 
PAUL CHULHIE KIM, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-00363) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 16, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 13, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Paul Chulhie Kim appeals pro se from the District Court‟s order dismissing his 
complaint.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court‟s order. 
I. 
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In 2013, Kim filed an employment discrimination complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In the complaint, Kim claimed 
that the Internal Revenue Service wrongfully failed to hire him twenty-four years ago 
when he attended a “job session” in Philadelphia in order to gain employment as a 
computer data entry clerk.  Complaint, ¶ III.B-C.  Kim claimed that, as a result of his 
unemployment, he has suffered various health ailments, including starvation, kidney 
failure, pneumonia, cancer, and mental illness.  Id., ¶ III.C, IV.  Kim sought $20,000,000 
in monetary compensation to “restore [his] trust in the American people and restore 
confidence in [his] natural United States citizenship.”  Id., ¶ V.  Kim also sought the 
appointment of counsel in the District Court.            
On January 31, 2013, the District Court entered an order dismissing Kim‟s 
complaint for failure to state a claim without leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B).  In its memorandum, the District Court noted that, while Kim appeared to 
be attempting to state a claim for employment discrimination under federal law, any 
claim of employment discrimination is barred by Kim‟s untimeliness in asserting his 
claim.  Following the District Court‟s dismissal of his complaint, Kim timely appealed to 
this Court and seeks appointment of counsel on appeal. 
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court‟s dismissal of the complaint under section 1915(e)(2)(B).  
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Pleadings and other 
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submissions by pro se litigants are subject to liberal construction, and we are required to 
accept the truth of Kim‟s well-pleaded allegations while drawing reasonable inferences in 
his favor.  See Higgs v. Att‟y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011); Capogrosso v. Sup. 
Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  However, a pro se complaint 
must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”‟ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Additionally, while affirmative 
defenses must be affirmatively pleaded, the District Court did not err in raising the 
untimeliness of the instant action sua sponte, as the defect was apparent from the face of 
the complaint. See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir. 2002).  We may summarily 
affirm a judgment of the District Court on any basis supported by the record if the appeal 
does not raise a substantial question.  See I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).     
The District Court correctly dismissed Kim‟s action against the IRS due to Kim‟s 
failure to timely exhaust his claim.  As Kim‟s claim arose in Pennsylvania, Kim was 
required to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
“within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful employment practice.”  See Mandel v. M & Q 
Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1)).  
Kim did not file a complaint with the EEOC and, if he had, he would also been required 
to bring an employment discrimination claim in federal court within 90 days of receiving 
a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); McCray v. Corry 
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Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 224, 227 (3d Cir. 1995).  As Kim had not filed a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment 
practice, but rather waited 24 years to assert his claim in the District Court, the instant 
action is clearly untimely, which warranted the dismissal of his complaint.  See, e.g., 
Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266, 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2007); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
5(e)(1).
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We have held that a district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without 
allowing the plaintiff leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.  
See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).  As Kim delayed bringing this 
action for 24 years, well outside the applicable time limitations, the District Court 
appropriately determined that further amendment would be futile.   
Accordingly, this appeal presents us with no substantial question, and we will 
summarily affirm the District Court‟s order.  See 3rd Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  
Kim‟s motions for appointment of counsel are denied.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 
155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). 
                                              
1
 The District Court also correctly explained that the applicable statute of limitations was 
not equitably tolled, as Kim acknowledged that he was aware of the facts underlying his 
claim for more than 20 years, and actively sought an attorney at that time to prosecute his 
claim, but ultimately did not bring any action before the EEOC or the federal courts until 
the instant action.  Complaint, ¶ V; Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 383-84 (3d Cir. 
2007).    
